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THE DEVELOPMENT AND FAILURE OF 
SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE 
PHILLIP STOUP† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Note analyzes the development and efficacy of social norms 
in maximizing the welfare of participants in the virtual community of 
Second Life. Although some of these norms developed appropriately 
in response to the objectives and purposes of this virtual world, 
Second Life is so thoroughly steeped in conditions that have impeded 
the development of successful social norms in other communities that 
any system of social norms in Second Life will ultimately fail. 
Because social norms will likely fail to successfully maximize resident 
welfare, regulatory schemes imposed both by the operators of the 
virtual world and by real-world governing institutions are needed to 
enhance the functioning of this particular alternative reality inhabited 
by millions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make 
about new technology, are highly likely to be false. This should 
make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The 
blind are not good trailblazers.1 
Despite Judge Frank Easterbrook’s admonition, for over two 
decades lawyers and legal scholars have debated the role, presence, 
and effect of real-world regulations on the internet and property in 
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cyberspace. For ease of understanding, this ongoing debate can be 
divided into two opposing viewpoints on how real-world legal rules 
and regulations should affect the internet and virtual property: first, a 
camp of “exceptionalists” who believe that cyberspace is 
fundamentally distinct from the real world and thus should be subject 
to a different set of rules, and second, a camp of “unexceptionalists” 
who believe that cyberspace is no different from the real world and 
should be governed by the same regulations.2 
Out of this debate between the exceptionalists and the 
unexceptionalists emerged a middle ground: the theory of “Code is 
Law” recognizes both the validity of cyberspace as a distinct world 
regulated by the computer code that defines it,3 and the theory 
acknowledges a need for some level of real-world regulations to 
protect the virtual world from infractions its regulating computer 
code cannot prevent.4 This theory, formulated primarily by Professor 
Lawrence Lessig, can be further illustrated by analogizing the balance 
between computer code and real-world law to a farmer installing 
fences around a field.5 There, the fencing operates like the computer 
code: it stops potential intruders from accessing the farmer’s land by 
making access to the land impossible where the fence bars the way. 
Like computer code that can be hacked or manipulated, however, a 
trespasser can climb over the fence or cut through its barbed wire. 
Therefore, society needs laws and rules like the tort of trespass to 
protect further the farmer’s land when the fence fails.6 In cyberspace 
this interplay between computer code–created rules and real-world 
regulation presents two questions, which are further explored in this 
Note. First, if there is to be a mix between code-created rules and 
real-world regulations, what is the optimal combination? And second, 
if code-created rules are to at least partially govern the internet and 
 
 2. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 213–14 (2007). 
 3. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 83–84 (2006) (“Life in cyberspace is 
regulated primarily through the [computer] code of cyberspace. . . . Regulated in the sense that 
bars on a prison regulate the movement of a prisoner, or regulated in the sense that stairs 
regulate the access of the disabled. Code is a regulator in cyberspace because it defines the 
terms upon which cyberspace is offered.”). 
 4. Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 59–60 (2007). 
 5. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 169–71. 
 6. Lastowka, supra note 4, at 60 (agreeing with Lessig that “the correct solution would not 
depend wholly upon technology, but would mix some degree of private fencing and some 
degree of trespass law”). 
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cyberspace, who is best positioned to create these new governing 
laws?7 
The optimal mix between code-created rules and real-world 
regulations could be determined by finding the “mix that provides 
optimal protection at the lowest cost.”8 Put differently, the 
determination of what norms ought to be used in cyberspace should 
be guided by the consideration of what norms will maximize the 
participants’ welfare.9 This economic-minded analysis is not a call for 
a uniform set of norms to be applied to the internet as a whole.10 
Instead, whatever norms that a society employs must necessarily be 
highly tailored to the context in which they are applied. Therefore, 
the first step in determining what norms should be used is to ascertain 
the potential objectives of the cyberspace being regulated.11 The 
second step, in light of those objectives, is to choose the rules that 
maximize the welfare of the various participants in this particular area 
of cyberspace.12 This highly tailored approach to rule creation in 
cyberspace may also require rules to be created by small communities 
that are intimately associated with the objectives of the portion of 
cyberspace being regulated. This microapproach to rule propagation 
suggests that social norms created by individual communities may be 
the most efficient approach to rule creation in cyberspace. 
Even if the above assertions are correct and lead to optimal 
welfare maximization, they are meaningless if the parties choosing the 
mix are irrational, if there exist inefficiencies barring an effective 
negotiation, or if other transaction costs are so high that it is 
 
 7. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 6–8 (identifying the choice of government and checks on 
that government as questions that should be answered). Lessig implied a desire for the users of 
the internet to create governing rules. He feared that the special interests of government would 
be ill suited to promulgate efficient regulating norms. Id. But see Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex 
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 553, 587 (1998) (arguing that code-created regulations should be harnessed in the service 
of state and regulatory interests). 
 8. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 169. 
 9. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the 
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989). 
 10. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 169 (1991) (“The hypothesis of welfare maximizing norms is not a blanket normative 
recommendation that social controllers use norms as rules.”). 
 11. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 59–60 (1998) (suggesting by way of example a 
method for analyzing social norms in a community). 
 12. See id. (explaining and applying the suggested two-step process for analyzing social 
norms in a community). 
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impossible to develop a system of norms that will regulate the 
participants in such a way that their welfare is maximized efficiently.13 
This Note analyzes one area of cyberspace, the virtual world of 
Second Life,14 to determine whether the mix of code-created rules and 
real-world regulation is maximizing the participants’ welfare. 
Additionally, this Note analyzes and compares the efficacy of norms 
being created by Second Life participants who are intimately close to 
its objectives against the norms being developed by the world’s 
creators or some real-world regulatory body. 
To determine if the norms in Second Life are efficient, several 
legal theorists’ observations regarding the emergence and efficacy of 
social norms in other communities will be used as a framework.15 To 
establish the first component of this framework, this Note surveys the 
conditions affecting the treatment of property in these other 
communities and analyzes the policies and objectives of those 
communities. The second component of this framework is established 
by comparing the conditions, policies, and objectives that gave rise to 
the social norms in these other communities with the conditions 
giving rise to the emerging norms in Second Life. This comparison 
illuminates the efficacy of social norms in Second Life. 
Although Second Life seems to be an ideal environment for 
social norms to maximize participants’ total welfare given the overall 
objective of this virtual world,16 the conditions of this virtual reality 
make social norms alone an inefficient vehicle to maximize the 
participants’ well-being. Part I of this Note describes the virtual world 
of Second Life and differentiates it from other cyber realities. Part II 
compares the objectives that gave rise to successful social norms in 
other small communities to some of the objectives that inspired the 
social norms that have developed in Second Life. Part III shows that 
conditions in Second Life are not conducive to social norms operating 
efficiently. Finally, to best allocate property rights within the virtual 
community and to guide real-world courts and regulators in resolving 
 
 13. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347–50 
(1967). 
 14. See infra Part I (describing the video game-like world of Second Life where people can 
interact with each other and the cyber-landscape in a virtual three-dimensional setting). 
 15. See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (revealing 
the complex web of relationships affecting lobster fishermen); Ellickson, supra note 9, at 84 
(“This essay advances the hypothesis that when people are situated in a close-knit group, they 
will tend to develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth-maximizing.”). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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virtual-world disputes, Part IV recommends combining real-world 
regulation with the code-based regulation in the virtual world. In 
conclusion, this Note observes that lessons learned from this analysis 
of Second Life can be extrapolated to other virtual realities and other 
online communities in an attempt to better maximize cyber residents’ 
welfare. 
I.  DESCRIPTION OF SECOND LIFE 
Second Life, created by the California-based corporation Linden 
Lab, is a virtual world in which users can interact with each other in a 
three-dimensional setting.17 Unlike other popular virtual worlds,18 
Second Life does not focus on a story or some overarching quest that 
unites its users.19 Instead, Second Life is simply a forum in which 
people, through virtual representations known as “avatars,” can 
interact with each other and engage in general commerce through the 
production, sale, and acquisition of virtual goods.20 
Second Life as a world is often referred to as the “grid.”21 The 
world of Second Life is referred to as the grid because its virtual 
landscape is nothing more than a patchwork of individual regions 
called “Sims,” which is short for simulators.22 These regions each 
cover an area of 65,536 virtual square meters and are often 
subdivided into smaller parcels, which residents can purchase for their 
own use.23 The grid is aptly described as a patchwork of Sims because 
each Sim is unique. For instance, some Sims are devoted to building 
activities and include vast empty areas where residents can build 
 
 17. Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the Future of 
National Power, INNOVATIONS, Summer 2007, at 27, 30 (describing Second Life as a simulated 
world, roughly the size of Singapore, with approximately seven million users). 
 18. Other virtual worlds include World of Warcraft, Eve Online, Sims Online and 
Everquest. 
 19. By contrast, the participants in the online multiplayer game World of Warcraft are 
united through the gameplay elements of engaging in various quests that increase the users’ 
virtual characters’ abilities and wealth. World of Warcraft Guide, http://www.worldofwarcraft. 
com/info/basics/guide.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 20. Second Life, What is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
 21. MICHAEL RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., SECOND LIFE: THE OFFICIAL GUIDE 366 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 22. Id. at 6. The name derives from the fact that each region was originally 
compartmentalized on its own server. Id. 
 23. See id. at 33 (setting out the fees per area).  
STOUP.DOC 10/31/2008  1:21:24 PM 
316 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:311 
objects.24 Other Sims are geared toward providing residents an area 
where they can engage in combat.25 Some Sims are dedicated to the 
special interests of a specific group of residents in Second Life and 
include massive buildings where the group can meet and discuss their 
common interests.26 Many Sims are even dedicated solely to providing 
Second Life residents a means to earn Linden dollars.27 
How each Sim is used is largely determined by the owners of that 
Sim. The owners of the Sim can shape how it is used by creating code-
based rules which will automatically prohibit certain behaviors the 
owners do not want occurring on their virtual land. For example, if 
the owners of a Sim do not want visitors to create objects while 
visiting their virtual property, the owners will select in the interface 
controlling the properties of their virtual land the option disallowing 
visitors to build objects.28 After the owners select this option, visitors 
to their virtual land will not be able to select the control menu that 
allows them to build objects, thus visitors will be unable to create 
objects.29 This method of control is an example of computer code–
based regulation governing how residents interact and behave in a 
Sim by establishing what behavior is possible. 
Another way that operators of a Sim can control how their 
virtual property is used is through establishing ground rules for how 
users can interact while on the operator’s land. These ground rules 
can be made public to visitors when they enter the virtual land.30 If 
 
 24. See id. at 267 (describing such Sims as “sandboxes”). 
 25. See PAUL CARR & GRAHAM POND, THE UNOFFICIAL TOURISTS’ GUIDE TO SECOND 
LIFE 79–82 (2007) (describing the history of “Jessie,” a no-holds-barred combat Sim). 
Residents’ avatars cannot be “killed” permanently. Instead, when avatars are slain they are 
kicked off the Sim where they died and are reincarnated at a point they designate as their home. 
See id. at 81 (mentioning this process). 
 26. See id. at 85 (describing a Sim called “Luskwood,” where a popular group known as 
“Furries” congregate). 
 27. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 285 (discussing “camping” jobs that pay 
residents solely for their presence). A Sim called “Money Island,” one of the most frequently 
visited Sims in Second Life, is an area of the virtual world where residents can make money 
simply by participating in short surveys. See Screenshot No. 1 (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (showing an avatar standing in front of a sign advertising how a resident could earn 
money by participating in a survey). 
 28. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 35 & fig.2.6 (showing how owners can control 
their virtual property by selecting options in the “About Land” panel). Some of the options 
users can select include “restricting access [to the land], issuing permission to run scripts, playing 
music, [and] banning specific residents.” Id. at 35. 
 29. Screenshot No. 2 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing in the upper left corner 
of the user interface screen an icon indicating that an avatar cannot build in that Sim). 
 30. For a description of some visitor-use restrictions, see infra notes 101–04 and 
STOUP.DOC 10/31/2008  1:21:24 PM 
2008] SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE 317 
any of the ground rules are broken, other residents can report the 
violation to the owners of the virtual property and the owners can 
remove, and even bar, the offending visitor from ever visiting their 
virtual land again.31 
One of the central tenets of Second Life is that its virtual world is 
created and owned by the residents and users who actively contribute 
to the world’s content on a daily basis.32 One way Second Life 
residents can contribute to the world’s content is by creating objects. 
Users can create objects in Second Life by using a relatively simple 
three-dimensional graphics-creation software embedded in the 
game’s interface.33 By using this interface, users can create objects 
ranging from houses to rocket ships and from televisions to 
holographic projectors.34 Through the object-creation system 
residents can even create the clothes and body parts that their avatars 
can “wear” to change their appearances.35 To promote this active 
production of user-created content, Linden Lab gave its residents 
ownership over any virtual property they created or acquired in 
Second Life.36 This decision led to Second Life being cultivated into a 
 
accompanying text. 
 31. Screenshot No. 3 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing the interface that can 
allow landowners to ban specific Second Life users from their virtual property). 
 32. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 4 (“Second Life is a 3D online digital world 
imagined, created and owned by its residents. . . . [It] is a virtual environment in which almost all 
of the content is created by users . . . . You are the one who determines what Second Life means 
to you.”). 
 33. Screenshot No. 4 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing an avatar using the 
three-dimensional graphics-creation software). 
 34. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 144–77 (describing the creation process); 
see also id. at 144–45 (picturing an airport); id. at 160 (leather chair); id. at 38 (water slide); id. at 
156 (oranges, apples, and bananas); id. at 297 (sea plane); id. at 126–27 (stone split-level near a 
lighthouse). 
 35. See id. at 166–68 (calling a wearable object an “attachment”). Users can create content 
by using the graphic-creation interface to manipulate and link together basic building blocks 
called “prims.” Id. at 146. Prims can be molded into various shapes, given different texture 
qualities, or combined to form larger, more complex objects. See id. at 147–58 (providing 
instructions). Through this sculpting, manipulation, and compilation of prims, users can create 
sophisticated objects like waterfalls to populate the Second Life world. See BRIAN A. WHITE, 
SECOND LIFE: A GUIDE TO YOUR VIRTUAL WORLD 120–68 (2008) (leading readers step-by-
step through the building process); id. at 273–78 (instructing readers how to construct a 
waterfall). 
 36. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316; see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 
487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[Linden Lab’s believes that its ownership] policy 
recognizes . . . users are making significant contributions to building these worlds and should be 
able to both own the content they create and share in the value that is created. The preservation 
of users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the emergence of genuinely real online 
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virtual market economy, populated by digital avatars buying and 
selling virtual goods.37 This economy of virtual goods does not stop at 
the edges of Second Life’s digital world, but instead continues 
actively in a variety of internet portals ranging from a currency 
exchange on Linden Lab’s website38 to online auctions run by eBay 
where residents can acquire parcels of land.39 
A Second Life resident gains a number of different ownership 
rights by acquiring virtual property. Some of these diverse ownership 
rights include the right to exclude others from using the property, the 
right to use the property, the right to destroy the property, the right 
to manipulate or alter the property, the right to prevent others from 
copying a unique or novel creation, and the right to put the property 
into the stream of virtual commerce by selling or transferring these 
rights to another resident. Exercising these entitlements can be done 
in a variety of ways. For example, the right to exclude others from 
property and the right to prevent copying of unique creations can be 
enforced by Linden Lab through the unique identification number 
Linden automatically generates for each item produced in Second 
Life.40 This unique identification number enforces the exclusionary 
right by allowing Linden Lab officials to track property back to its 
 
worlds.” (quoting Press Release, Linden Lab, Linden Lab Preserves Real World Intellectual 
Property Rights of Users of Its Second Life Online Services (Nov. 14, 2003) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal))). 
 37. Second Life has been described by its founder Philip Rosedale as being 
a developing nation . . . . When we were developing the idea we read a lot of books 
and were inspired by Hernando DeSoto’s The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism 
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. 
. . . The fundamental basis of a successful developing nation is property ownership. If 
people cannot own property, the wheels of western capitalism can’t turn from the 
bottom. 
Aleks Krotoski, Second Life and the Virtual Property Boom, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED’S GAMES 
BLOG, June 14, 2005, http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/games/archives/2005/06/14/second_life_and_ 
the_virtual_property_boom.html (quoting Philip Rosedale). 
 38. Residents of Second Life can trade U.S. dollars for Linden dollars on an exchange 
hosted by Linden called LindeX. See Second Life Currency Exchange, https://secure-
web20.secondlife.com/account/login.php?type=second-life-member&nextpage=/currency/index. 
php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Linden dollars are the currency used by residents in Second Life. 
Id. 
 39. Second Life, Land Auctions, http://usd.auctions.secondlife.com (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
 40. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 7 (“[A]ny of the data [acquiring a unique 
ID] is guaranteed to be unique across space and time . . . .” (quoting Jeff Luan)). 
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rightful owner to prevent thefts or unauthorized copying of a virtual 
object.41 
Another important feature of Second Life is the basic rules 
Linden Lab has set to govern residents’ behavior in general. The core 
rules governing interaction between residents are contained in the 
Community Standards.42 These rules are also commonly referred to as 
the “Big Six.”43 Instead of creating clear bright-line rules that 
residents must conform with precisely, these rules delineate what 
conduct is prohibited by establishing general standards of how 
residents should behave.44 The Big Six are enforced primarily by 
residents making complaints to Linden Lab authorities.45 If residents 
violate any of the Big Six rules, they run the risk of being suspended 
from Second Life or even having their accounts terminated 
permanently.46 But the efficacy of these enforcement measures is 
uncertain, particularly the ability to terminate users’ accounts, which 
results in the individual losing their virtual  property. Part III explores 
the effectiveness of these enforcement measures in more detail. 
Finally, the combination of Second Life’s interactive culture and 
the virtual world’s democratic code-based infrastructure, which allows 
residents to define and implement rules determining their and other 
residents’ behaviors,47 presents an interesting confluence of two types 
of social norms regulating user behavior in the virtual world. The first 
type of social norms, referred to as “non-code-based norms” for the 
 
 41. See id. (detailing how Linden Labs can use the identification number); see also id. at 
165 (describing how an object’s creator can limit, through “asset permissions” in the Build 
window interface, other residents’ use of that object). 
 42. Second Life, Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last viewed 
Aug. 29, 2008). 
 43. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 40–42. The Big Six prohibit the following conduct: (1) 
“Intolerance”; (2) “Harassment”; (3) “Assault”; (4) “Disclosure [of another resident’s personal 
information]”; (5) “Indecency”; and (6) “Disturbing the Peace.” Second Life, Community 
Standards, supra note 42. 
 44. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42. For example, “harassment” is 
described as “[c]ommunicating or behaving in a manner which is offensively coarse, intimidating 
or threatening, constitutes unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, or is 
otherwise likely to cause annoyance or alarm.” Id. 
 45. See Second Life, Online Harassment, http://secondlife.com/policy/security/harassment. 
php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (instructing victims to file abuse reports for violations of Linden 
Lab’s Community Standards). 
 46. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 40. 
 47. “Democratic” in this instance refers to an approach of code creation, and in turn rule 
creation, which is decentralized, open to all residents, and not exclusively in the hands of the 
world’s operators or original creators. For a description of the types of user-created rules, see 
infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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remainder of this Note, are norms that residents and the operators of 
Second Life create and enforce. An example of a non-code-based 
norm is the Big Six rules of behavior propagated by Linden Lab and 
policed largely by residents. Another example of non-code-based 
norms is the sanction of unfavorable gossiping.48 
The second type of social norm in Second Life is code-based 
norms. Code-based norms can be created and employed by both 
residents and Linden Lab to fulfill the virtual world’s important 
objectives, but unlike non-code-based norms, these rules are enforced 
through the very computer code of Second Life. As illustrated by the 
theory of “Code is Law,”49 these norms enforce rules by defining what 
conduct or behaviors are possible in the computer program’s virtual 
world. An example of a code-based social norm is an object creator’s 
ability to define who can use the virtual property by making it 
impossible for those not entitled to use the property to put it into 
their inventory—a cyber “purse” where residents can store items they 
have collected.50 Another example of a code-based social norm is the 
ability to define how an object will be used even after it has left the 
creator’s control.51 Like the previous examples for non-code-based 
norms, this list is not an exhaustive survey of all the code-based social 
norms in Second Life. The residents’ ability to define through the 
very code of Second Life’s program how their property is used, 
transferred, manipulated, or destroyed even after it has left the 
creator’s control presents a plethora of possible code-based social 
norms that are commonly used to achieve the important objectives of 
this virtual community. 
 
 48. Users can sanction violators with unfavorable gossip by reporting the violator’s illicit 
behavior (usually conduct prohibited by the Big Six) on public weblogs and websites. See infra 
Part III. 
 49. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 50. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 165 (discussing asset permissions); see also 
id. at 128 (showing a screenshot of an aviatar’s inventory and explaining how an inventory 
functions in Second Life). 
 51. See generally WHITE, supra note 35, at 229–51 (describing some thirty ways in which 
scripting language, a more sophisticated component of the object-creation system, allows users 
to manipulate their creations’ qualities). For instance, a script can be placed on a house to make 
it impossible for certain residents selected by the owner to enter the home. See id. at 230, 245–46 
(describing a mechanism for locking one’s virtual door). 
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II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NORMS IN  
A SMALL COMMUNITY 
To better understand how norms developed in Second Life and 
whether those norms are efficient in maximizing residents’ welfare, 
this Part compares studies of social norms in other communities. This 
comparison focuses on the objectives and other factors that gave rise 
to effective social norms in these other communities. This comparison 
reveals that social norms have thrived in communities in which 
effective monitoring and sanctions for offending behavior are 
possible, adherence to and knowledge of the existing social norms are 
pervasive, and reciprocity between the community’s members is 
common. In addition, the comparison focuses on which conditions 
prevent social norms from maximizing participants’ welfare. 
Although the communities in this comparison are smaller and quite 
different in composition from the virtual world of Second Life, the 
common themes of these communities are illustrative in evaluating 
the potential success or failure of code-based and non-code-based 
social norms in Second Life. 
A. Development of Norms in Other Small Communities 
Like many fisheries across the world, the lobster beds off the 
coast of Maine are a finite resource. But unlike many fisheries, the 
Maine lobster beds are closely guarded and monitored by effective 
social norms that have emerged from the close-knit community. One 
of the most important social norms to emerge in this community was 
the establishment of territories over which small groups of 
lobstermen could claim ownership.52 This particular social norm 
emerged, at least in part, to address the important objective of 
preserving the lobster population levels in Maine’s coastal waters.53 
Although the gangs’ territories are not recognized by any regulatory 
 
 52. See ACHESON, supra note 15, at 3 (“The most distinctive feature of lobstering clusters 
or harbor gangs is that they claim and defend fishing areas. Territoriality does not exist in any 
other Maine fishery.”). The lobstermen of Maine are mostly divided into smaller groups often 
referred to as harbor gangs. Id. at 48. These smaller groups possess tracts of water off the coast 
in which they have the right to set traps for lobsters. See id. at 48–49 (describing the gangs’ 
system of communal ownership). Through the social norms established by the larger 
community, gang members may destroy other gangs’ traps placed within the first gang’s 
territory. Id. at 48–49. 
 53. See id. at 55–56 (“[B]iologists are convinced that a fixed number of legal-sized lobsters 
inhabit any given area. If one man takes them, another cannot.”); id. at 154–57 (laying out the 
economic and biological benefits of the gangs’ trap-limiting policies). 
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body outside the small lobstermen communities, these norms are 
effective in regulating the lobstermen’s interactions and, more 
importantly, their exploitation of the open resource of the lobster 
beds.54 Partially privatizing the open resource is also advantageous 
because it forces the gangs to internalize the costs of owning their 
tracts.55 
Effective monitoring and enforcement of the norms are two of 
the factors contributing to the success of these social norms when 
they operate outside the bounds of official regulation.56 If conditions 
had made effective monitoring impossible, or if the repercussions for 
violating the social norms were inadequate, then the norms would 
likely have been ineffective in regulating community participants’ 
behavior. 
Similar to the emergence of social norms in the lobstermen 
communities, social norms emerged among early American whalers 
to address the varying needs of their resources’ particular 
characteristics. Depending on the type of whale, the needs of the 
whalers were fundamentally different.57 Early American whalers 
primarily hunted two types of whales:58 the sperm whale, which is an 
aggressive, quick-moving creature that can be difficult and even 
dangerous to catch;59 and the right whale, which by contrast is a slow 
and docile creature that is significantly easier to kill.60 Unlike the 
sperm whale, however, the right whale can sink after it is killed, thus 
making it difficult for the whalers who killed the beast to claim its 
carcass.61 The different characteristics of these two resources 
generated different norms determining when and how a whaler could 
 
 54. See id. at 49, 154–57 (describing the self-imposed regulations’ efficacy). 
 55. See Demsetz, supra note 13, at 350 (“[T]he main allocative function of property rights is 
the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects . . . .”). 
 56. See ACHESON, supra note 15, at 73–77 (examining how the lobstermen police their 
territory). 
 57. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 89–94 (describing whaling property norms as the wealth-
maximizing outgrowth of different whale species’ attributes). 
 58. See id. at 91 (discussing the different norms for sperm and right whales). 
 59. See id. (“[S]perm whales swim faster, dive deeper, and fight more viciously than right 
whales . . . . The vigor of the sperm whale . . . increased the chance that a line would not hold or 
would have to be cut to save the boat.”). If the sperm whale were able to break free from the 
lines and escape the hunt, it could still die later to be harvested by whalers who did not exert 
any effort or undertake any risk to capture the creature. See id. at 92 (describing the emergence 
of the “iron-holds-the-whale” rule). 
 60. See id. at 89 (“Because right whales are relatively slow and docile, a whale on a line was 
not likely to capsize the harpooning boat, break the line, or [otherwise escape] . . . .”). 
 61. Id. at 89–90. 
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establish a property claim over a slain or wounded whale because a 
single property norm would not have successfully accounted for both 
sperm and right whales’ respective traits.62 For example, a rule that 
allocated property rights to whoever first marked the whale with a 
“waif,” or unique harpoon, was effective for sperm, but not right, 
whales.63 The waif system suited sperm whales because they travel in 
schools, rewarding “boatsmen [who could] kill or mortally wound as 
many animals as quickly as possible” without forcing them to “paus[e] 
to secure the stricken whales to the mother ship.”64 But the waif 
system would have provided the wrong incentives for hunting docile, 
solitary right whales; instead, granting rights to whoever could keep 
the whale tethered to their ship “reward[ed] the first harpooner, who 
had performed the hardest part of the hunt, as opposed to free riders 
waiting in the wings.”65 
These norms were successful in regulating the behavior of the 
whalers because the social norms incorporated the community’s 
important objective of allocating the ownership of the whale in such a 
way to maximize the community’s wealth.66 Additionally, the norms 
were successful because they were adopted and respected by the 
members of the whaler communities.67 If these norms had not been 
followed by members of the community, or had there been a large 
influx of outsiders who disregarded the social rules, these norms 
would have been ineffective in regulating the participants’ behavior in 
this small community.68 
Finally, to at least partially avoid the high transaction costs 
associated with resorting to the legal system for rule enforcement, a 
small community of ranchers in a rural region of northern California, 
Shasta County, developed a set of social norms to regulate the 
behavior of the community’s members.69 For example, the social norm 
 
 62. See id. at 88–92 (differentiating the “fast-fish, loose-fish” rule for right whales from the 
“iron-holds-the-whale” rule for sperm whales). 
 63. See id. at 91–92 (describing the “waif-holds-a-whale” practice). 
 64. Id. at 91. 
 65. Id. at 89–90. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 94 (“Whalers had little use for law or litigation. . . . [F]or more than a 
century[,] American whalers [were] able to resolve their disputes without any reassurance from 
American courts.” ). 
 68. See id. at 94–95 n.39 (describing the norms’ breakdown as the whaling community 
became “less close-knit” and “whalers’ informal system of social control began to unravel”). 
 69. See ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 52, 61 (describing the residents’ practices and 
attitudes). 
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of “neighborliness” was developed in this small community to protect 
the community members from the trespass of other members’ cattle.70 
The social norm of neighborliness operates by creating the 
expectation that it is not morally justified to either reap a benefit or 
cause harm to another person without first providing fair 
compensation.71 Thus, a rancher whose cattle wanders into a 
neighboring ranch causing damage to the neighbor’s property would 
be compelled under the guidance of the social norm of neighborliness 
to provide fair compensation for the damaged property, even though 
the rancher may not be required to do so under state law because 
both tracts of land are in an “open range.”72 This loosely defined 
social norm of neighborliness is effective in regulating the community 
members’ behavior because this form of social control is enforced 
through effective self-help sanctions like negative gossiping.73 
Negative gossiping is an effective sanction because the community’s 
participants highly value their reputations and their reputations can 
be marred by negative social gossip spreading through the tight-knit 
community.74 If either the members of the community did not value 
their reputations, or there was no reciprocity between the neighbors, 
the sanction of negative gossip would be an ineffective means of 
enforcing the social norm. Additionally, like the norms that 
developed in the community of lobstermen and whalers, the social 
norms that developed among these ranchers were successful because 
they incorporated the community’s important objective of avoiding 
the high transaction costs that can arise when disputes resort to legal 
resolution. 
The efficacy of social norms in these three communities required 
not only the incorporation of the communities’ important objectives 
into the structure of the norms, but also the presence of a number of 
other factors. Some of the factors necessary for social norms to 
function efficiently include effective monitoring and sanctions for 
 
 70. Id. at 53. 
 71. See id. (“Cattlemen typically couch their justifications for the norm in moral 
terms. . . . Dick Coombs: It ‘isn’t right’ to get free pasturage at the expense of one’s 
neighbors. . . . Attorney-rancher Pete Schulz: A cattleman is ‘morally obligated to fence’ to 
protect his neighbor’s crops, even in open range.”). 
 72. See id. at 56 (describing one such incident). 
 73. See id. at 58 (illustrating how “truthful negative gossip” effectively sanctions 
nonneighborly behavior without resort to any legal authority). 
 74. See id. at 57 (describing the ranchers of Shasta as a close-knit group of neighbors who 
strongly “value their reputations in the community” because they plan to reside in Shasta 
indefinitely). 
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offending behavior,75 adherence to and knowledge of the existing 
social norms,76 and reciprocity between the community’s members.77 
No one of these factors is likely dispositive in determining the success 
or failure of a social norm; taken together, however, these factors can 
determine whether a set of norms will efficiently regulate a 
participant’s behavior within a community. 
B. The Development of Social Norms in Second Life 
Like social norms in other communities, social norms in Second 
Life developed largely in response to the virtual world’s important 
objectives. Some of the important objectives in Second Life include 
the objectives of “creator empowerment,” “respect,” and 
“entrepreneurship.” 
One of Second Life’s important objectives is to provide users the 
ability to maintain ownership rights over their virtual land and 
property.78 To perpetuate this objective of “creator empowerment,” 
the virtual world of Second Life has developed a set of social norms 
enabling owners of virtual property to define how their property is 
used. These norms are exercised both through the very code of the 
Second Life program and through the rules propagated by Second 
Life residents. For example, code-based social norms, like the ability 
to exclude others from using a virtual object through Second Life’s 
scripting language, can define and protect an individual’s ownership 
over virtual property.79 Similarly, non-code-based social norms such as 
owner-created rules protect ownership rights by defining how visitors 
to an owner’s Sim should behave.80 Unlike code-based norms 
regulating visitor behavior, non-code-based norms require monitoring 
by the virtual land’s owner and other visitors. If offending behavior is 
discovered, the landowner can enforce social norms preserving the 
 
 75. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra Part I. 
 79. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 80. The Sim titled “The Sand Box on Heron Island” delivers rules to visitors the moment 
they enter the Sim in two ways: Rules are sent first via a message to the resident, delivered as a 
downloadable note. The rules of the Sim are also made available via giant signs near the 
entrance of the Sim. The sign in this particular Sim is user friendly, complete with a computer 
code function allowing the resident to change the language of the sign if the user does not read 
English. Screenshot No. 5 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing the downloaded note 
transmitted automatically to the Sim’s visitors and the billboard that welcomes the visitors when 
they arrive). 
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creator empowerment objective by either removing the offender from 
the Sim using a code-based tool or reporting the offender to Linden 
authorities for further sanctions.81 
Another important objective of Second Life is to ensure that the 
interaction between the world’s residents is respectful.82 This 
objective prompted the development of norms fulfilling the objective 
of user “respect.” One of these norms in Second Life is the Big Six 
rules created by Linden Lab.83 Code-based norms like the automated 
controls set by Sim owners can also regulate the behavior of visitors 
to a Sim and thus also serve to fulfill the objective of ensuring 
respectful interactions between Second Life residents. For example, 
Sim owners can designate their Sims, through the user interface 
controlling the properties of their Sims, a “safe zone” where it is 
impossible to bring any object classified as a weapon.84 This code-
based norm is often employed to keep “griefers,” Second Life 
residents who intend to harass and annoy other residents,85 from 
creating a nuisance in a Sim. 
Furthermore, the objective of “entrepreneurship” developed in 
Second Life in response to Linden Lab’s desire to build a virtual 
world where the users would populate the alternate reality with user-
created content.86 To perpetuate the entrepreneurship objective, 
multiple social norms in Second Life emerged. These norms serve the 
entrepreneurship objective by creating incentives, primarily the 
incentive of earning a profit—both in the form of real-world currency 
and the virtual currency of Second Life—to create objects that will 
populate the virtual world. The entrepreneurship objective has 
largely been realized by several non-code-based norms that were 
established by Linden Lab in response to the growing requests of 
many Second Life residents. In particular, Linden Lab decided to 
adopt a “laissez-faire policy on buying and selling the official in-world 
 
 81. Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45. 
 82. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (requiring users, through Second 
Life’s Community Standards, to treat each other with “respect and without harassment”). 
 83. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the broad standards of 
conduct with which the Big Six rules require residents to comply and how the rules are often 
enforced by residents lodging complaints of violations). 
 84. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 211–12 (describing how it would be impossible to 
bring a weapon into a “safe zone” because the code of Second Life will automatically remove 
any person who attempts to enter a safe zone with a weapon). 
 85. WHITE, supra note 35, at 358 (“A griefer is an individual whose enjoyment of [Second 
Life] is enhanced by negatively affecting the experience of other [Second Life] residents.”). 
 86. See supra Part I. 
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currency” on open markets like Amazon or eBay for real-world 
money.87 Additionally, Linden Lab followed the suggestions of 
Professor Lessig and began to formally recognize Second Life 
residents’ intellectual property rights over the objects they created 
within the virtual world.88 These two policies, inspired by Second Life 
residents, were the nucleus of the virtual economy’s boom because 
these norms established the foundations of a viable market economy 
by creating real incentives for individuals to invest time and effort in 
creating virtual goods.89 
Although these three important objectives and their 
corresponding norms cover a wide range of interactions in Second 
Life, they are by no means an exhaustive list of the objectives and 
norms that have developed in the virtual world. This limited sample, 
however, serves as a useful starting point for determining whether the 
necessary conditions are present for social norms to effectively 
regulate the cyber-reality of Second Life. 
III.  CONDITIONS FACILITATING AND IMPEDING THE  
EFFICACY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE 
Studies of social norms in other communities indicate that 
several conditions may be required for social norms to successfully 
maximize the welfare of Second Life participants.90 Some of the 
conditions include effective monitoring and adequate sanctions for 
behavior that violates the norms, adherence to and respect for the 
established norms, and reciprocity between the participants in the 
community.91 Despite the existence of some conditions facilitating the 
development of social norms in Second Life, the pervasive presence 
 
 87. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316. This laissez-faire policy is different than 
the stance taken by many other online virtual worlds that forbid the exchange of virtual 
currency for real-world currency. See, e.g., World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (“Blizzard 
does not recognize any virtual property transfers executed outside of the Game or the 
purported sale, gift or trade in the ‘real world’ of anything related to the Game. Accordingly, 
you may not sell items for ‘real’ money or otherwise exchange items for value outside of the 
Game.”). 
 88. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316. 
 89. See id. (describing how the growth of a “substantial mercantile class” of artisans, 
entertainers, builders, and designers was the byproduct of Linden Lab’s decisions to allow 
residents to retain ownership of virtual goods and to allow the free exchange of virtual Linden 
dollars for real-world currency). 
 90. See supra Part II.A. 
 91. See supra Part II.A. 
STOUP.DOC 10/31/2008  1:21:24 PM 
328 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:311 
of conditions impeding the development of social norms such as the 
inadequate sanctions implemented by Linden Lab, ineffective 
policing for offensive conduct, marginal adherence to the social 
norms resulting from an influx of uneducated outsiders, and a lack of 
reciprocity stemming from the anonymous format of the network, 
have likely stymied the efficacy of social norms in maximizing the 
welfare of the virtual world’s residents. 
A. Monitoring and Sanctions 
Similar to the monitoring scheme enacted by the Maine 
lobstermen,92 much of the monitoring for offending behavior in 
Second Life is conducted by the participants in the community. For 
instance, when a resident contravenes one of the standards set out in 
the Big Six, any resident who witnessed this breach of conduct can file 
a report with Linden Lab and start a process that could end in a 
sanctioning of the alleged illicit behavior.93 Additionally, groups of 
concerned residents have also come together to form groups that 
police the Sims of Second Life, looking for any residents who are 
acting in contravention of the norms of respect. One of the most 
famous vigilante groups is the Second Life Alliance.94 Unlike the 
above example of individuals acting independently, members of the 
Second Life Alliance dealt directly with the offensive behavior by 
punishing it in turn with their own form of griefing.95 
Unlike the relatively small community of Maine lobstermen, the 
world of Second Life is massive with over fifteen million registered 
users,96 thousands of groups,97 and more than twenty million dollars 
spent in the virtual world every month.98 Because of the massive scope 
and scale of interactions between Second Life residents, it is very 
difficult for Linden Lab authorities to effectively monitor the entire 
 
 92. See supra notes 52–56. 
 93. Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45. 
 94. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 66. 
 95. See id. (describing how the Alliance built massive ships around the afflicted areas, and 
how they used these ships to compel behavior the Alliance deemed acceptable). 
 96. Second Life, Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 97. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 50. 
 98. See Second Life, Economic Statistics: Graphs, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-
graphs.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (indicating the historic amount of U.S. dollars spent per 
month in Second Life). 
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grid.99 This inability to police the entire grid could prompt users to file 
tort claims of negligence against the operators of the virtual worlds 
for failing to ensure the safety of the network.100 Therefore, the 
exponential success and growth of Second Life may have generated 
the condition of ineffective monitoring which will in turn impede the 
proper development of efficient social norms. 
Despite the inherent difficulties of monitoring a massive 
community of individuals, Second Life has improved on the group 
monitoring schemes used by the Maine lobstermen by employing 
some automated monitoring controls to alert Linden officials of 
offending behavior. For instance, when a resident tries to bring a 
weapon into a Sim that is designated a safe zone and is booted off 
that Sim for the offending conduct, Linden Lab is eventually alerted 
to the individual’s trespass on the norm of respecting the Sim owners’ 
intent to keep their Sim a safe environment.101 Even more automated 
monitoring controls have been developed by Second Life residents 
through the adaptable scripting-language feature. For example, 
scripted language can be added to virtual objects making it impossible 
for other users to place the object in their inventory.102 Thus the object 
itself incorporates antiburglary measures that are in some ways more 
powerful than real-world burglary protections.103 Automated 
monitoring controls, like the two above examples, are likely the most 
efficient and effective means to monitor illicit conduct because these 
controls can be accomplished with little cost once the code is 
created.104 Although this automatic control seems to be the most 
 
 99. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 66–67 (relaying how many residents have complained 
that it takes Linden officials a long time to respond to complaints, sometimes up to an hour, and 
how many complaints remain unresolved without an investigation or sanction). 
 100. Benjamin Duranske, Virtually Blind’s Predictions for Virtual Law in 2008, VIRTUALLY 
BLIND, Jan. 1, 2008, http://virtuallyblind.com/2008/01/01/2008-virtual-law-predictions. 
 101. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 211–12 (noting that Linden Lab will suspend a 
resident who repeatedly tries to bring a weapon into a Sim designated as a safe zone). 
 102. See Screenshot No. 6 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing an avatar not being 
able to pick-up an object because the “take” command which would normally allow the avatar 
to do so is grayed out and unavailable). 
 103. For example, a car alarm in real life will only deter burglars from stealing a car. Script 
language in Second Life can change the very qualities of a virtual object, making it impossible 
for a potential thief to pick up the object. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
protections in Second Life, which actually determine what is possible, are more powerful 
defenses than the simple deterrents of real-world protections. 
 104. The costs of maintaining the code-based automatic monitors are likely to be less than 
the costs of employing Linden Lab employees, or other residents, to patrol the cyber-streets of 
Second Life. Automated code monitors will likely cost less because a single piece of code can 
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efficient system of alerting Linden officials to illicit conduct, 
automatic monitors cover few of the behaviors outlawed in Second 
Life and are thus an inadequate solution to the problem of 
monitoring the massive world. 
Although there is some evidence of successful monitoring 
schemes in Second Life, the virtual world has long struggled to 
implement effective sanctions that deter offensive behavior and 
enforce established norms. An example of an early sanction’s failure 
to effectively enforce norms was the use of the “cornfield purgatory” 
to punish residents.105 The cornfield purgatory sanction entailed 
banishing a resident who violated one of the rules of Second Life to a 
Sim where all the resident could do was ride a tractor in a field of 
corn.106 This sanction was ultimately an ineffective deterrent because 
many residents wanted to see the cornfield purgatory and started to 
purposefully violate Second Life’s rules to experience the tractor 
ride.107 
Amusing anecdotes aside, the failure to employ effective 
sanctions has continued in Second Life. For example, one of the most 
common sanctions employed in Second Life is the punishment of 
negative gossiping.108 Gossiping as a sanction has been used to 
publicly shame residents who have employed automated programs 
known as “landbots,”109 which frustrate the objective of 
entrepreneurship in Second Life. One weblog in particular compiles a 
list of all known landbots and their possible operators so that 
residents who have their land sold unbeknownst to them by a landbot 
can contact the landbot’s operator and request a refund.110 Though 
alerting other residents to the illicit behavior of some may serve a 
 
apply to all objects in Second Life and would require little involvement from Linden Lab 
employees once implemented, whereas personal monitoring would require many Linden Lab 
employees or Second Life Residents. 
 105. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 43. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Second Life, Community: Incident Report, http://secondlife.com/support/ 
incidentreport.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (listing the offenses reported to the Second Life 
Governance Team, and the eventual sanctions given to the offenders). 
 109. Landbot Invasion, Landbot FAQ, http://landbot.wordpress.com/landbot-faq (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008) (defining “landbots” as automated computer programs that search 
through listings of Second Life land for sale and purchase the land cheaply even when the owner 
may not intend to sell the land for that price). 
 110. Landbot Invasion, Landbot Directory, http://landbot.wordpress.com/directory (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
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useful purpose, gossiping is likely an ineffective deterrent if the 
offenders do not care about their reputations or if the offenders can 
easily change their identities. Because residents in Second Life can 
easily change their identities,111 the sanction of gossiping is likely not 
an effective sanction. Furthermore, unlike the residents of Shasta 
County who closely guarded their reputations, many residents in 
Second Life are indifferent to other residents’ perceptions of them 
and are thus unaffected by negative gossip. For example, a Second 
Life resident named Lazarus Devine angered many other users by 
erecting garish virtual signs calling for an end to the war in Iraq and 
to “Impeach Bush” on property he purchased adjacent to the 
disgruntled users.112 The disgruntled users tried to stop the sign 
propagation by engaging in negative gossip and a heated campaign of 
sending the offending resident an endless stream of “instant 
messages” complaining about his actions.113 Despite the best efforts of 
the disgruntled users, Lazarus Devine continued his campaign to 
erect garish signs.114 
Even Second Life’s harshest sanction, the threat of account 
termination, which is prescribed as a possible punishment in the 
virtual world’s Term of Service, is also likely an ineffective sanction.115 
Because the potential property loss from an account termination is 
great,116 it is uncertain whether Linden Lab has the authority to 
terminate a user’s account without providing compensation for the 
lost virtual property. This uncertainty became evident in a 2007 
preliminary ruling in a federal case concerning a dispute between 
Linden Lab and a disgruntled former user.117 In the ruling, the federal 
 
 111. See infra note 139. 
 112. Steven Johnson, Brave New World, DISCOVER, Mar. 4, 2006, http://discovermagazine. 
com/2006/apr/well-intro. 
 113. See id. (explaining how the angered residents engaged in negative gossip by erecting 
their own signs which said “Impeach Lazarus Devine”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Second Life, Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Oct. 
10, 2008). 
 116. The Second Life Terms of Service indicates that a user will not receive compensation 
for a terminated or suspended account: 
In the event that Linden Lab suspends or terminates your Account or this 
Agreement, you understand and agree that you shall receive no refund or exchange 
for any unused time on a subscription, any license or subscription fees, any content or 
data associated with your Account, or for anything else. 
Id. 
 117. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Plaintiff, 
March Bragg, Esq., claims an ownership interest in such virtual property. Bragg contends that 
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judge hinted that although the property in dispute was “virtual,” the 
ownership entitlements to the virtual property may be real and thus 
the plaintiff’s seizure claims could be valid.118 As a result, Linden Lab 
may no longer be able to utilize the sanction of account termination 
without first providing compensation for the user’s lost virtual 
property. 
B. Adherence to Social Norms 
As another condition necessary to facilitate the efficacy of social 
norms in Second Life, residents must adhere to the social norms of 
the virtual world. Because Second Life as a world and a community is 
so expansive and diverse,119 it is difficult to gauge the level of 
adherence with any amount of precision. Despite this reality, an 
analysis of the general types of communities in Second Life can be 
useful in determining the level of adherence to social norms. 
Generally, there are two types of communities in Second Life: those 
that congregate on a Sim they control, and those that have no Sim 
control. The first group can implement social norms and enforce 
adherence with real success. Communities with virtual land can 
enforce norms and create adherence because ownership of land 
empowers an individual to enact several measures that can aid in 
increasing the rate of adherence to social norms.120 The first of these 
measures is notification and publication of the norms. Owners of 
Second Life land can enable an automatic function, to inform the 
visitor of the virtual property’s rules once the visitors enter the virtual 
land.121 Because nonlandowners do not have access to this feature, it is 
harder for nonlandowners to inform residents of the governing social 
norms, and will correspondingly impact the rate of adherence. 
Nonlandowners have some tools at their service to inform other 
residents of norms. These tools include objects with script language 
that will communicate the social norms to any residents in proximity 
to the automated virtual object,122 manual distribution of note cards 
 
Defendants, the operators of [Second Life], unlawfully confiscated his virtual property and 
denied him access to their virtual world.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (detailing that more than 70 percent of Second Life’s 
users reside outside of the United States). 
 120. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 122. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 195 (displaying scripting language that can 
be added to a virtual object to make that object “chat” with any residents in proximity). 
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detailing the norms, and dissemination of the rules through online 
websites outside of Second Life.123 Although these measures will 
spread details of the social norms, they are likely neither as effective 
nor as efficient as the automated controls because the automated 
controls will inform every visiting resident whereas the nonlandholder 
measures will likely miss some residents because they have a more 
limited reach. 
The second measure land-controlling groups have at their 
disposal are the automatic controls to police and enforce established 
social norms. Virtual landowners have the ability to enable 
automated, code-based controls that can monitor certain behaviors 
and either alert the virtual property owner to that offensive behavior 
or automatically boot the offender from the virtual land.124 
Nonlandholding groups, however, must rely on group policing and 
the limited presence of Linden authorities to ensure that their norms 
are upheld.125 Similar to the inefficiencies inherent to the 
nonautomated means of distributing the details of governing norms, 
nonautomated enforcement measures are more likely to fail to catch 
offending behavior than are automated controls. Additionally, the 
automated controls are more likely a less expensive method than 
employing individuals to watch for behavior violating relevant social 
norms. For these reasons, the level of adherence to social norms in 
Second Life largely depends on the availability of tools to 
automatically inform residents of the norms and enforce them. 
Therefore, although it is impossible to determine the universal level 
of adherence in Second Life, the applicable level can be determined 
on a smaller scale by looking to see which communities have access to 
these tools, and which do not. 
Additionally, other factors like the influx of outsiders who 
disregard the established norms can have a deleterious effect on the 
level of adherence in a community.126 Because Second Life is an open 
network expanding rapidly,127 a deluge of outsiders disregarding the 
 
 123. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (listing the Big Six rules). 
 124. For a description of how one control was designed to automatically boot residents who 
attempted to bring guns into Sims designated as safe zones, see supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
 125. For a description of the difficulty associated with policing the entire grid, see supra note 
99 and accompanying text. 
 126. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 94. 
 127. Compare Second Life, Economic Statistics, supra note 96 (indicating that Second Life 
has more than fifteen million registered users), with Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (explaining 
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social norms is likely an ever-present problem in the virtual world. 
The influx of disruptive outsiders that motivated a group of Second 
Life citizens to form vigilante groups similar to the Second Life 
Alliance is one of the more infamous examples of this problem.128 In 
the early days of Second Life, a large group of users from a 
competitive and battle-oriented virtual world joined Second Life and 
began to harass and attack the once peaceful residents.129 This influx 
of outsiders with different cultural norms threatened the peaceful and 
cooperative culture of Second Life. But two coinciding occurrences 
greatly diminished the threat posed by these disruptive outsiders: 
concerned citizens began to retaliate against the disruptive outsiders 
by building defensive fortifications to keep the militant faction out of 
the peaceful areas of Second Life, and Second Life’s grid expanded so 
much that Second Life users who wanted to fight had new territories 
all to their own.130 The threat of outsiders undermining community 
norms can also be limited by organizing groups with exclusive 
membership and by limiting other residents’ access to any Sims a 
resident controls.131 Despite these salves, the flood of new residents 
joining the world of Second Life on a daily basis has created a reality 
in which outsiders will continually challenge the established norms. 
Finally, limited evidence of well-developed relationships 
between Second Life users suggests some of the conditions which 
made the social norms in the Shasta County rancher community 
successful may be present in Second Life. One of the conditions 
which made social norms successful in Shasta County was the close 
relationships that existed between the community members.132 Even 
though the world of Second Life is immense and highly 
heterogeneous,133 the virtual world’s residents are continually brought 
together by the desire to create micro-communities where residents 
can share their interests with other like-minded individuals.134 These 
 
that Second Life had only seven million registered users in the second quarter of 2007). 
 128. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 314–15 (describing the war of the Jessie Wall). 
 129. Id. at 314. 
 130. Id. at 315. 
 131. See Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45 (describing how owners of land can 
determine, via code-based controls governing the settings of their property, which residents of 
Second Life can enter their Sim). 
 132. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 56–64 (noting that Shasta residents prefer self-help 
tactics). 
 133. See Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (noting the large size of Second Life and that the 
majority of users reside outside of the United States). 
 134. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 50–51 (describing some of the many thousands of 
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groups often lead to multiple interactions between Second Life 
residents. For instance, the Second Life Bar Association has regular 
meetings in which residents come together and discuss their opinions 
about the emerging legal issues in Second Life.135 These meetings give 
individuals the chance to share opinions, knowledge, and life 
experiences with each other, thus providing the opportunity to form 
close relationships. 
Even though Second Life community members can form close 
relationships in the virtual world, there is little evidence that the 
virtual environment provides residents the chance to form multilevel 
relationships like those formed in the small Shasta cowboy 
community.136 A multilevel relationship is a relationship in which 
individuals share connections extending beyond a single association.137 
An example of a multilevel relationship in Shasta County would be 
the relationship that two farmers have as neighbors, compounded by 
their relationship as members of the local Cattleman’s Association, 
compounded by their relationship as distant cousins because the 
Shasta community is so small and insular. In contrast, Second Life 
residents generally only share one relationship, their virtual 
relationship.138 
Additionally, similar to the situation in the Shasta County 
community, some argue there is evidence of good reciprocity amongst 
Second Life residents. Although anonymity is inherently present in 
Second Life’s utilization of avatars and fictitious names to represent 
residents in the virtual world, and despite the fact that fraud is ever 
present because residents can create multiple accounts for $9.95 a 
month,139 there is some evidence that the avatar system actually 
 
groups on Second Life in which people with interests ranging from knitting to automobiles can 
come together to share their passions). 
 135. Second Life Bar Association, SLBA Meetings, http://slba.info/meetings.html?current 
=three (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 136. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 10 (detailing how neighbors in Shasta County had 
relationships with others in a number of capacities and how these deep relationships assisted in 
the enforcement of norms). 
 137. See id. (same). 
 138. Although this observation seems to be generally true, there is some evidence that 
Second Life residents attempt to form more complex relationships by establishing real-world 
relationships along with their virtual relationships. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 
320 (describing a couple who met on Second Life, became romantically involved in the real 
world, and formed a Second Life business as partners). 
 139. Id. at 17. The ability to create multiple accounts can facilitate fraud because victims 
would be unable to identify and avoid the residents who committed the fraudulent act. For 
example, someone could be scammed by a user represented by a tall female avatar, only to 
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creates better reciprocity than the blind interactions that dominate 
most other transactions on the internet. For instance, at least one 
study has posited that the use of avatars may actually create more 
trust between users and thus promote more frequent and repeated 
exchanges between users than would occur in other internet spaces 
that do not have the avatar interface.140 Assuming this is true, it is still 
unclear whether having avatars on Second Life is more likely to 
exceed, or at the very least match, the level of reciprocity that exists 
in small real-world communities with repeated face-to-face 
interactions. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether similar 
levels of reciprocity between residents exist in Second Life as it 
existed between the ranchers in Shasta County. 
Despite evidence of conditions facilitating the successful 
development of social norms such as the effective automated 
monitoring tools and close relationships that can form between 
residents, it is likely that the pervasive impeding conditions in Second 
Life undermine these facilitating factors. Impeding conditions ranging 
from the inherent challenges of monitoring a community populated 
by millions of users to the unavailability of effective sanctions to 
enforce social norms and the failure to form multilevel relationships 
all likely have created an environment in which social norms alone 
are inefficient in maximizing the participants’ welfare. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATING SECOND LIFE 
The shortcomings of social norms in efficiently regulating Second 
Life can be rectified by expanding the use of regulatory schemes 
employed both by Linden Lab and by real-world governments. 
Linden Lab already has at its disposal a tool that can rapidly improve 
the conditions in Second Life so that user-created social norms can 
thrive. This tool is the code-based automated monitoring and sanction 
mechanisms focused in 2008 on a limited set of behaviors in Second 
Life. By extending these automated controls to cover a wider set of 
illicit behaviors, such as using two different accounts to perpetrate a 
fraud against another resident, Linden Labs could improve the 
reciprocity between individuals and in turn improve a set of social 
norms like the norms trying to fulfill the objective of respect. 
 
unwittingly be scammed again by the same user, this time represented by a short, fat male as an 
avatar. 
 140. Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 40. 
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One potential automated control inspired by the norm of respect 
could be a feature that allows a resident to “tag” a Second Life user 
so that the resident will be informed when the tagged user is on the 
same Sim, or if the offensive behavior warranting the tag was 
sufficiently severe, Linden Lab could create a virtual restraining order 
that would cause the offending user to be booted from the grid 
whenever the user approached the original victim. Residents could 
use this potential feature to avoid unwanted confrontation with 
undesirables, thus improving the Second Life experience. Although 
this salve could improve the Second Life experience, the feature 
could be abused by the very griefers it seeks to limit.141 To minimize 
any abuse, Linden Labs could require Second Life users utilizing the 
tag feature to complete a brief application describing the harm they 
are trying to limit. This additional step would help curb any potential 
abuse by griefers by ensuring only legitimate complaints warrant a 
punitive virtual restraining order. 
Beyond automated controls, Linden Lab could institute non-
code-based reforms to improve the efficacy of social norms in the 
virtual world. For instance, Linden Lab could clear up the uncertainty 
surrounding the enforceability of Second Life’s harshest and likely 
most effective sanction, account termination, by devising a clearer 
and more comprehensive set of rules for punishing residents. Instead 
of only prescribing the severe punishment of “immediate and 
permanent suspension or cancellation of your Account” for any 
transgression of the broadly defined Big Six rules,142 Linden Lab 
should create a more comprehensive penal code. This code could 
clearly outline the specific punishment for a particular behavior. For 
instance, although shoving or shooting an individual in a safe area 
may be undesirable behavior,143 it seems irrational to terminate a 
user’s account, which is a potential punishment under the Terms of 
Service,144 solely for this marginal transgression.145 A more 
proportional punishment may be temporary account suspension. On 
 
 141. Griefers could abuse a tag feature by using it on innocent Second Life residents. 
 142. See Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115 (illustrating that Second Life relies 
more on broadly defined standards than on explicit rules for conduct because what behavior is 
considered offensive is defined broadly). 
 143. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (indicating that shooting or 
shoving an individual may constitute an “assault”). 
 144. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115. 
 145. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 210 (describing how a resident cannot be 
permanently killed by any violence in Second Life). 
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the other hand, the penal code could prescribe the harsh punishment 
of account termination and even a report to the real-world authorities 
for such illicit conduct as the dissemination of pornographic material 
in a Sim designated for teens. 
Although Linden Lab has indicated its ability to dole out lesser 
punishment,146 the opacity of which punishment will be prescribed to 
the offensive conduct can make Linden’s response to certain 
misconduct seem irrational. Not having a clearly outlined penal code 
could make punishment to an outsider uninformed of the world’s 
objectives and norms seem irrational. For instance, an uninformed 
outsider may find terminating the account of a user who uploaded 
spyware into the virtual world to be harsh and irrational when 
compared to the lack of action taken against users who fornicate in 
public.147 It is important that Linden Lab’s response appear rational—
level of punishment corresponds to the necessary protection required 
to deter societal harms—because a real-world court would be more 
inclined to enforce the rules erected by Linden Lab if the court 
determines the rules were instituted for rational reasons.148 
To ensure that regulations created by Linden Lab will 
simultaneously fulfill the objectives of the site and maximize the 
residents’ welfare, the democratically inspired social norms of the 
virtual world should be used as a model for any regulations. For 
example, the social norm of creator empowerment could guide 
Second Life’s potential codification of punishments for offensive 
behavior. Instead of relying on the uncertainty of a real-world court 
system in adjudicating the copyright claims that are beginning to 
emerge in Second Life,149 a penal code created by Linden Lab could 
 
 146. See Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115 (“You agree that Linden Lab may 
take whatever steps it deems necessary to abridge, or prevent behavior of any sort on the 
Service in its sole discretion, without notice to you.”). 
 147. See id. (describing how both types of conduct are partially forbidden); see also Second 
Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (detailing how some regions in Second Life are 
designated as “Mature” zones where adult activity can presumably occur in public). 
 148. See Portola Hills Cmty. Ass’n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 582–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that unreasonable covenants and restrictions created by homeowner’s associations to 
govern their communities are not enforceable equitable servitudes); Hidden Harbour Estates, 
Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that a restrictive 
covenant erected by a home owner’s association that is related to the “health, happiness, and 
enjoyment of life of the various unit owners” can justifiably be enforced under a standard of 
reasonableness). 
 149. Benjamin Duranske, Six Major Second Life Content Creators Sue Alleged Copyright 
Infringer in NY Federal District Court, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Oct. 27, 2007, 
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/10/27/content-creators-sue-rase-kenzo (describing a copyright 
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authorize explicit punishments such as account suspension for the 
unauthorized copying of an individual’s creation. Linden Lab could 
also find inspiration for future regulations in regulatory models 
proposed and created by its residents. For instance, a Second Life 
resident named James Miller created a proposed code to guide 
conflict-resolution hearings between avatars when disputes emerged 
in the virtual world.150 Although this user-created regulation may have 
captured many of the objectives of the virtual reality, it likely failed to 
take hold because of the size and heterogeneous nature of the 
network. Therefore, implementing a system-wide regulatory scheme 
would likely require a centralized institution with the means to reach 
all Second Life users. The propagation of an explicit penal code, 
arbitration system, or other legal mechanism would have the 
additional effect of educating real-world courts about the important 
norms or objectives in the virtual world, thereby increasing the 
probability that an outside legal system would allocate property rights 
justly. 
No matter how powerful or elaborate the automated controls 
are, and regardless of how sophisticated Second Life’s preestablished 
rule structure becomes, there will likely always be individuals who 
have the inclination to ignore the clear rules and the knowledge 
necessary to tear down Linden’s code laws. When the fencing of 
Linden’s automated code fails, the regulations of real-world authority 
will be needed to effectively govern Second Life. 
Before posing recommendations for how real-world regulatory 
bodies could effectively aid in the governance of virtual worlds like 
Second Life, it is useful to note that the presence of real-world 
authority has been felt in cyber-realities before. Real-world 
intervention in Second Life has not been direct, but instead felt 
through the actions taken by Linden Lab in response to a potential 
regulatory threat. For example, in 2007 Linden Lab closed all 
gambling establishments in Second Life in an attempt to preempt 
 
infringement case filed in 2007 in a federal district court in New York). 
 150. See Johnson, supra note 112 (setting forth a “conflict-resolution proposal featuring 
about 50 separate articles, sections, and clauses. . . . [such as] ‘SECTION IV[:] A jury will meet 
on a hidden, off-world island, owned and maintained by Linden Lab. . . . [and] equipped with a 
number of simple Jury Meeting Rooms, suitable for a jury of 7 to meet, as well as interview 
parties in disputes’”); see also Bryan Gardiner, Bank Failure in Second Life Leads to Calls for 
Regulation, WIRED, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/ 
news/2007/08/virtual_bank (describing how the Second Life Exchange Commission, a user-
created entity modeled after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, was created to 
address allegations of fraud in the virtual reality’s nascent securities markets). 
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potential regulations that could have resulted from an FBI 
investigation.151 In other sites, real-world authorities have directly 
regulated user conduct. For instance, police in Holland arrested a 
young boy for theft after he broke into the virtual home of a user in 
the cyber-reality “Habbo Hotel” and stole the virtual furniture in the 
home.152 
Assuming government regulation of virtual realities is desirable, 
the most pressing question becomes what level of intervention is 
appropriate. The level of government regulation, like an attempt to 
refine automated code controls or erect a more sophisticated set of 
internal regulations, should be guided by the users’ social norms. 
Entrepreneurship norms could guide the government in potentially 
imposing some of the real-world regulations governing the law of 
contracts—like the concept of promissory estoppel—to reduce 
several of the risks associated with engaging in economic transactions 
with other consumers in the virtual world. Such an imposition of real-
world law could aid in furthering the objective of entrepreneurship in 
Second Life and would likely be a desirable addition. Additionally, 
digital legal protection similar to the provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may be needed to assist in 
protecting Second Life’s automated code-based controls.153 Protection 
similar to the DMCA would likely make it illegal for any individual to 
hack or manipulate the computer code controlling the virtual world. 
Thus, similar to Lessig’s fence analogy,154 a DMCA-like piece of real-
world legislation would serve to protect the virtual world when its 
code-based fences fail. 
Even if real-world regulation is desirable, a regulatory presence 
that is too oppressive should be avoided. Similar to the fracturing that 
occurred after the government heavily regulated internet file-sharing 
programs like the popular program “Napster,”155 real-world 
 
 151. Duncan Riley, Second Life Bans Gambling Following FBI Investigation,  
TECHCRUNCH, July 25, 2007, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/07/25/second-life-bans-gambling-
following-fbi-investigation. 
 152. Robin Raskin, Virtual Theft, Real-World Punishment, YAHOO! TECH,, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://tech.yahoo.com/blogs/raskin/16052. 
 153. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (making it 
illegal to use or disseminate technology that circumvents the digital protections placed on 
copyrighted material). 
 154. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & John Crowley, Napster’s Second Life?: The 
Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1775, 1780 (2006) (discussing how 
the government’s attempt to forestall MP3-transferring sites like Napster failed and how the 
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regulation could lead to the dissolution of Second Life. The 
dissolution of Second Life could result from oppressive real world 
regulation because users may become dissatisfied with the regulatory 
yoke placed on their virtual experience and thus opt to leave the site 
and either create their own smaller Second Life-like virtual worlds or 
join another cyber-reality.156 This potential fracturing of Second Life 
into a myriad of independent, smaller virtual worlds would ultimately 
create a galaxy of cyber-realities too volatile and numerous to be 
effectively governed by institutionalized real-world regulation.157 
Although some fragmentation may be desirable,158 decentralizing 
virtual worlds would have the adverse effect of removing the 
beneficial presence of the Leviathan-like head of the state, such as 
Linden Labs in Second Life. Maintaining a singular head of the 
virtual state is important because a single head of state can pool 
resources to implement beneficial changes such as establishing a 
system of uniform norms guiding participants’ interactions and can 
create code systems defining the virtual world’s reality in such a way 
that it betters the residents’ collective experience. Furthermore, the 
virtual head of state can serve as a focal point in negotiating and 
facilitating relations between the virtual world and real-world 
regulators. 
To improve the efficacy of social norms in Second Life, Linden 
Lab should engage in reforms ranging from the institution of new 
code-based tools to more comprehensive internal regulations to 
perpetuate and protect the important objectives—creator 
empowerment, respect and entrepreneurship—of the virtual reality. 
If these measures fail, however, the authority and force of external 
regulation may be needed to protect or further the objectives of 
Second Life. Regardless of the scope of internal or external measures 
taken to improve the conditions in Second Life, any action should 
consider the important objectives that formed the core of the virtual 
reality’s social norms. 
 
web evolved to avoid this regulation by becoming a decentralized archipelago of file-transfer 
sites too numerous to be regulated by the government). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. (predicting that a fracturing of virtual worlds would create a situation, similar to 
the negative end result of the fracturing of file-sharing programs, in which it would be 
impossible for governing bodies to effectively regulate the plethora of virtual worlds). 
 158. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 3–7 (2007) (explaining that, even though 
fragmentation could have deleterious effects on free speech and the marketplace for ideas, 
fragmentation does allow individuals to optimally follow and consume their particularized 
interests). 
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CONCLUSION 
Because social norms alone cannot efficiently maximize 
participant welfare in Second Life, real-world regulators will likely 
have to expend valuable resources to help prevent and resolve cyber 
conflicts. Although some may regard any allocation of state resources 
to resolve this problem as a waste, there are several compelling 
reasons why this society should not ignore Second Life or treat it as 
merely a fad. The first is the immense size of Second Life’s virtual 
population and economy. As of 2008, Second Life had over fifteen 
million users who collectively spend more than twenty million dollars 
in the virtual world every month.159 The massive exchange of real-
world currency in this virtual reality has turned Second Life into a 
discrete microeconomy that can cause real-world consequences. One 
of the more pronounced real-world consequences was the havoc that 
resulted from the virtual banking industry’s collapse in Second Life. 
Following the financial missteps of one of Second Life’s banks,160 
Second Life users lost an estimated $750,000 in real-world money in 
the virtual economy.161 Given that Linden Lab has refused to take 
affirmative action to ameliorate the problem,162 the vacuum may need 
to be filled by government regulation or the affected individuals will 
be with left with no recourse. 
Immediate concerns affecting the virtual reality of Second Life 
are not the only reasons to pay attention to this cyber reality. Lessons 
gleaned from Second Life can also be used to resolve conflicts in 
other virtual realities. For instance, the failures and successes of social 
norms examined in this Note could be used to help successfully 
resolve a dispute that has emerged in the virtual reality of “World of 
Warcraft” (WoW). WoW is a virtual world similar to Second Life in 
which individual users can interact with each other and the virtual 
three-dimensional environment in a real-time setting.163 WoW is 
different than Second Life in that the virtual reality is based primarily 
 
 159. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 160. Duncan Riley, Virtual Banking Banned in Second Life, TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 8, 2008, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/01/08/virtual-banking-banned-in-second-life (describing how a 
Second Life bank “Ginko Financial” offered Second Life residents Ponzi-like interest schemes 
but ultimately had to declare itself insolvent). 
 161. Robin Sidel, Cheer Up, Ben: Your Economy Isn’t as Bad as This One, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
23, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120104351064608025.html?mod=hpp_us_inside_today. 
 162. Id. (discussing how Linden Labs has done nothing to help the users reclaim their lost 
money). 
 163. World of Warcraft Guide, supra note 19. 
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upon a gamelike platform in which the world’s users focus primarily 
on gaining combat experience, skills, and items to best each other and 
to defeat the computer characters in the game.164 The conflict in WoW 
that the lessons of Second Life can be used to resolve concerns a 
complaint filed in a federal court by the operators of the virtual 
world.165 The complaint alleges that a third-party program, called the 
Glider, has tortiously interfered with the contracts between WoW and 
its users.166 The real-world regulator being asked to resolve this 
dispute, a federal court in Arizona, should consider the important 
objectives and norms of the virtual world before rendering any 
decisions. Following the social norm construct used by Ellickson in 
his study of the Shasta cowboys,167 one of the important objectives of 
WoW is to preserve the fairness of the gamelike environment of the 
virtual world.168 If “fairness of the game” is an important norm of 
WoW, the Glider program may be violating that norm because it 
permits some participants in the game to manipulate the rules of the 
world to create an unfair advantage.169 Consequently, the disruptive 
nature of the Glider program, which may not be visible to an outsider, 
affects the in-game experience for many users and thus makes it 
difficult for WoW to deliver a satisfactory gaming experience to its 
customers. The social-norm analysis that this Note invokes could aid 
the federal court in determining how to efficiently and justly allocate 
the entitlements in a case presenting unique issues in a context, which 
a federal court may not clearly understand. The lessons that can be 
gleaned from Second Life and the real-world impacts it has on 
individuals are two reasons indicating why Second Life deserves 
meaningful attention. 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Complaint at 2, MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02555-
DGC (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 25, 2006). 
 166. Benjamin Duranske, WoW Glider Summary Judgment Motion Filed; Blizzard Exhibits 
Include Castronova Expert Report, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Mar. 23, 2008, http://virtuallyblind.com/ 
2008/03/23/mdy-blizzard-motions. The Glider program is a piece of software that allows users to 
“automate key tasks in World of Warcraft . . . . [allowing] users to . . . harvest resources and 
generate high level characters without actually playing.” Id. Some individuals find the Glider 
desirable because it allows users to accumulate these valuable commodities without having to 
endure the labor and time other users expend to gathering these resources. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 168. See World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 87 (“Nonetheless, certain 
acts go beyond what is ‘fair’ and are considered serious violations of these Terms of Use.”). 
 169. Edward Castronova, Effects of Botting on World of Warcraft 16–20 (unpublished 
expert opinion, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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As more attention is focused on Second Life and its virtual-world 
kin, the democratically inspired norms that guide these virtual worlds 
should not be forgotten. Following the advice of Judge Easterbrook,170 
the new regulators of these virtual worlds will not be good legal 
trailblazers if they begin their pursuit blind to the objectives of this 
new frontier. 
 
 
 170. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
